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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERA ARLENE FERGUSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
case No. 14639 
LOWELL GENE FERGUSON, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action was initiated by Plaintiff-Appellant, 
after the annulment of her second marriage, seeking re-
instatement of alimony payments from her first husband, 
Defendant-Respondent herein, judgment for back alimony 
not paid by Defendant-Respondent during the Plaintiff's 
second marriage, and increased child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart Hanson, Jr. ordered that 
child support payable by Defendant to Plaintiff be in-
creased from $70.00 per month to $160.00 per month for 
each of the parties' three minor children. The Court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ruled that Defendant's obligation to pay alimony 
ceased upon her remarriage, and that Plaintiff did 
not show any evidence of an exceptional circumstance 
for which alimony could be reinstated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests that 
the court affirm the decision of the Lower court ter-
minating Plaintiff's right to alimony from the Defend-
ant and reverse the Lower Court's award of child 
support and attorney's fees in excess of that which 
Plaintiff-Appellant prayed for in her Order to Show 
cause and pleadings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent adopts Plaintiff-Appellant's 
statement of facts with the following factual and pro-
cedural additions: 
Factual 
Testimony and evidence received at the hearing 
of the within matter demonstrated that Plaintiff, 
Arlene Ferguson, did not request alimony from the 
husband of her remarriage solely on the basis of her 
feeling that he would not pay such alimony, if awarded. 
No showing was made to the annulling court of her financial 
need (T. 126) or of her husband's ability to pay, yet 
evidence was received in this matter that Mr. Hunsaker 
-2-
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had the financial ability to support his former wife 
both during and after their marriage. Mrs. Ferguson 
testified that during her marriage to Mr. Hunsaker 
both owned and made payments upon their homes and 
Mr. Hunsaker made monthly payments to Mrs. Ferguson 
in the approximate amount of $250.00 (T. 74). Real 
property was acquired by Mrs. Hunsaker in anticipa-
tion of the marriage (T. 76), and Mr. Hunsaker, with 
Mrs. Hunsaker's consent, applied for a home construc-
tion loan within two and one-half months after the 
marriage. Mrs. Ferguson further testified that she 
was not aware of Mr. Hunsaker's financial condition 
(T. 79), nor did she ask him, and at no time did she 
ever seek alimony from Mr. Hunsaker (T. 126). 
Procedural 
Defendant received notice that Plaintiff's 
second marriage was annulled on October 18, 1974. 
After several letters from Plaintiff and her counsel 
requesting reinstatement and payment of back alimony, 
and after the filing of the within Order to Show cause, 
Defendant attempted to collaterally attack the Hunsaker 
annulment on several grounds, including collusion upon 
the District court and lack of jurisdiction in that the 
grounds upon which annulment was based were not suffi-
cient to grant jurisdiction to the annulling court. 
-3-
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The District court, prior to making its Findings in 
the Hunsaker annulment, entered Mr. Hunsaker's de-
fault, apparently upon a stipulation between those 
parties. The court then entered Findings and Decree 
based upon financial misrepresentations. 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requested: 
(a) increased child support from $70.00 per child 
per month to $140.00 per child per month: (b) in-
creased alimony from $150.00 per month to $300.00 
per month: (c) back alimony for the months during 
which the Plaintiff was married to Mr. Hunsakerr (d) 
$500.00 attorney's fees: and (e) contempt of court 
for failure to pay alimony during the subject Hun-
saker marriage. 
Thereafter, because of Defendant's alleged 
refusal to answer interrogatories respecting his 
financial condition until Plaintiff proved her 
right to reinstatement of alimony, the Law and 
Motion Judge entered an Order of Sanction which 
deemed Defendant to be financially able to provide 
whatever amount the Plaintiff could demonstrate was 
needed for child support and alimony, if awarded 
(T. 187). Accordingly, Defendant was not allowed 
-4-
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y 
to present any evidence as to his financial status. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD 
PIAINTIFF-APPELIANT BACK AND FUTURE ALIMONY PAYMENTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant's entire argument rests upon 
two Utah Supreme court decisions, both of which are dis-
tinguishable on the facts and both of which have been 
made inapplicable to this matter by legislative amendment. 
(A) Enactment of §30-1-17.2, Utah Code Annotated. 
As correctly noted and quoted by Plaintiff-
Appellant, Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d 
279 (1960), held that a husband is obligated to pay 
alimony to his former wife after the annulment of her 
remarriage since the policy of the state was not 
served where the wife could not look to any other 
person for such support. Since annulment proceed-
ings did not grant the court jurisdiction to award 
1/ At no time did the Plaintiff-Appellant move to amend the prayer of relief to conform with Judge Hanson's 
finding of child support in the amount of $180.00, 
which was $20.00 over that which was requested by the 
Plaintiff-Appellant, or $800.00 for attorney's fees, 
$300.00 over that which was requested. The court, 
on its own motion, amended the petition to "conform" 
with its own findings, however, Defendant contends 
that it had no jurisdiction to do so. (See court's 
bench ruling at T. 191 and Defendant's arguments at 
T. 187). 
-5-
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alimony or support, the only other source would be 
the wife's former husband: 
"There being no valid marriage, the 
purported wife would not be entitled to 
support from the purported husband, in 
the absence of a statute allowing alTrii:ony 
in case of annulment." (Emphasis added) 
356 p. 2d at 281. 
Since the court's holding in Cecil and in 
Kent v. Kent, 28 U.2d 34, 497 P.2d 652 (1972), the 
Utah Legislature passed Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 
Section 3(a), which provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
"30-1-17.2 If the parties have 
accumulated any property or acquired 
any obligations subsequent to the 
marriage, or there is a genuine need 
arising from economic change of cir-
cumstances due to the marriage, or if 
there are children born, or expected, 
the court may make temporary and fina 1 
orders, and subsequently modify the 
orders, relating to the parties, their 
property and obligations, the children 
and their custody and visitation, and 
the support and maintenance of the par-
ties and children, as may be equitable •.. " 
Thus, the legislature insured that a wife could, 
under the circumstances cited, look tx>the husband of 
an annulled marriage for support. Having released 
her first husband by remarriage, she is now authorized 
to look to her second husband for support and main-
tenance. The Utah Legislature apparently adopted the 
arguments of Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr. in his 
treaties on the Law of Domestic Relations: 
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"Most of these exceptional cases 
arise when the wife's second marriage 
is annulled. The conventional analy-
sis formally was that the annulment 
amounts to a declaration that no valid 
marriage ever existed. The purported 
marriage, therefore, cannot effect ex-
isting legal rights. Modern cases are 
beginning to reject this view, and to 
treat the effect of an annulment (at 
least for this purpose) as analagous 
to the effect of divorce. On that 
analysis, the annulment of the wife's 
second marriage would not revive her 
rights under the alimony decree. This 
result is certainly correct as a matter 
of policy. Once the wife remarries, 
her first husband should be entitled 
to assume that his duty to pay her 
alimony is at an end, and to adjust 
his financial affairs accordingly. 
If her second marriage is later annul-
led, her first husband is not respon-
sible and should not have to face a 
revival of a liability which, in many 
cases, will cause him unforseeable 
hardship. He ought not to be made the 
underwriter of his former wife's marital 
disasters. The solution for the wife's 
difficulties is not to make her first 
husband resume the burden, but to pass 
a statute like that in New York authoriz-
ing alimony in annulment suits." 
H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 
458 (1968). 
Plaintiff's argument that Utah Code Annotated, 
§30-1-17.2 does not apply to her case since there was 
no finding of a genuine need arising from economic 
change of circumstances due to the marriage, fails of 
logic where it is shown that not only was such a find-
ing never made, it was never requested by Plaintiff in 
her default annulment proceedings. Plaintiff, by her 
-7-
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marriage to Hunsaker, gave up her right to support 
($150.00 per month) from the Defendant-Respondent, 
and by her annulment gave up an additional $250.00 
per month which she was receiving from her second 
husband. Such change of financial circumstance is 
a fact which would have allowed her the right to re-
quest alimony or support from Hunsaker, which request 
was never made. 
Plaintiff's contention that the annulment Decree 
did not find a genuine need arising from economic change 
of circumstances due to the marriage can only imply that 
in spite of her loss of alimony and support from Defend-
ant-Respondent herein, and in spite of her anticipated 
loss of support from her second husband, no genuine 
financial need existed. For the very same reason, the 
Lower court, in the instant matter, found that Plaintiff 
had failed to demonstrate not only a genuine need aris-
ing from change of circumstances, but also any excep-
tional circumstance which would allow an unconscionable 
or inequitable result if the wife's right to alimony 
was terminated. Austead v. Austead, 2 U.2d 49, 269 P.2d 
284 (1954). In Austead, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
remarriage of an ex-wife terminated her right to receive 
alimony from her first husband. The court, however, 
noted an exception to the genera 1 rule if "an excep-
-8-
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tional circumstance" existed where it would be either 
unconscionable or inequitable to terminate the wife's 
right ~o al:mony. 
In Cecil and Kent, the supreme Court found 
exceptional circumstance where the wife's subsequent 
marriage was annulled. In both Cecil and Kent, the 
Court relied upon the fact that the wife had no right 
to support arising from a marriage which was subse-
quently annulled, the courts being greatly influenced 
by a public policy of insuring to a wife a legal right 
to support. At the same time, the Court recognized 
" •.• it would be inequitable for her to obtain the 
right to support from two sources." Cecil, 11 U.2d 
at 158, 356 P.2d at 280. 
Further, Plaintiff-Appellant's reliance upon 
the dictum in Cecil that the wife's attempted marriage 
did not adversely alter or change her former husband's 
circumstances so that it would be inequitable to re-
quire him to continue his alimony payments, is mis-
placed since (a) no evidence was allowed to be pre-
sented that the Defendant-Respondent had in fact 
reconunitted his assets and would have suffered adversely 
by an award of alimony against him and in favor of 
Plaintiff-Appellant, and (b) Plaintiff showed no evi-
dence of the Defendant's circumstances. No "equitable 
-9-
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considerations" are cited which would favor an order 
that Defendant pay back alimony. Indeed, the entire 
record is devoid of any such equitable considerations. 
(B) Cecil and Kent are Distinguishable. 
Both Cecil and Kent dealt with void marriages, 
and the District court in each case had the jurisdic-
ti on and power to declare the marriages annulled and 
void ab initio. It is questionable that Plaintiff was 
entitled to an annulment upon the grounds indicated in 
the annulling court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. While Defendant-Respondent does not allege 
fraud upon the court, it is obvious that the Hunsaker 
parties entered into a stipulation which could well be 
regarded as collusive action directly and adversely 
effecting the rights of the Defendant-Respondent who 
was not allowed, in the Lower court, to collaterally 
attack the Hunsaker proceedings. As the Lower Court 
correctly noted in its memorandum decision (T. 151): 
" •.• In the instant case the annulment was based upon 
fraudulent misrepresentations as to financial status, 
at best a ground which at common law made the marriage 
voidable." (T. 152). 
Further, equitable considerations were cited in 
both Cecil and Kent, thus complying with the standards 
set forth in Austead v. Austead. In both cases, the 
-10-
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marriages were extremely short lived: in both cases 
the wife could look to no other individual for her 
support and main~enance oy law: and, in both cases 
there is the implication or the stated fact that the 
wife was dependent upon charity for her maintenance. 
In the instant matter, Plaintiff-Appellant advanced 
no "exceptional circumstances" which would allow the 
District court to reinstate alimony against her first 
husband. The Lower court is generally afforded wide 
latitude in determining both change of circumstance 
and the existence of exceptional circumstance, and, 
unless found to be capricious or arbitrary, that 
finding has constantly been supported in the appellate 
process. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HER 
NEED FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ALIMONY 
In its Memorandum Decision dated the 4th day of 
November, 1975 (T. 151), the District court, in rely-
ing on Austead v. Austead, maintained that in spite of 
§30-1-17.2 the court retained jurisdiction to determine 
whether "exceptiona 1 circumstances" exist which would 
allow a wife to retain alimony upon remarriage. In 
making such a determination, the Court may consider why 
no award of alimony was made in the Decree of Annulment, 
-11-
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a fact which the Court found to be relevant to the 
question of the needs of Plaintiff as they relate 
to the reinstatement of alimony. The court further 
found that, since the rights of the Defendant with 
respect to his duty to pay alimony were effected by 
the determination of the annulling court (or its 
lack of determination), Defendant may collaterally 
attack the Decree of Annulment to the extent that 
such a determination reflected the needs of his former 
wife. Accordingly, it was determined that Plaintiff 
had tile burden to establish a prima facia case against 
Defendant-Respondent. 
The court found that the Plaintiff had not 
shown any exceptional circumstances for which ali-
mony should be reinstated. Indeed, Plaintiff 
testified that not only was alimony not awarded 
by the annulling court, but she did not request 
such alimony. To the extent that Defendant-Respond-
ent was able to collaterally attack the annulment pro-
ceedings, the Court heard and found evidence of Mr. 
Hunsaker's financial condition and abilities and it 
appears therefrom that, had the Plaintiff sought such 
support from Hunsaker, he would have indeed been able 
to provide such financial support. (T. 159-172). The 
Court found that there was indeed an economic change 
-12-
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of circumstance due to the marriage of the Plaintiff 
and Mr. Hunsaker, however, no genuine need arose there-
zrom. I~ is i::ogi~a: for Plaintiff to assert that, 
while no genuine need arose from her change of circum-
stance as a result of her marriage to Mr. Hunsaker or 
as a result of the annulment of the Hunsaker marriage, 
there was a genuine need or change of circumstance 
which would give rise to a reinstatement of alimony 
from the Defendant herein, especially in the absence 
of other facts which would evidence any other genuine 
need of the Plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION IN REFUSING TO AWARD BACK OR FUTURE ALIMONY 
TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
The Lower court, in its Memorandum Decision, cor-
rectly recognized that 11 in any event, alimony is not 
automatically reinstated without a determination by the 
court of those respective needs and abilities (referring 
to the parties) and if reinstated, runs from the date 
of reinstatement, not from the date of a voided 
marriage. 11 (T. 153). 
Plaintiff's reliance that the annulment was 
void ab initio and therefore should relate back to 
the date of the marriage is simply a legal fiction 
designed to do justice between the parties to the 
-13-
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annulled marriage and should be pierced to protect 
the rights of a third party. Sefton v. Sefton, 291 
P.2d 439, 45 Cal.2d 872 (1955). 
"However, in cases involving the 
rights of third parties, courts have 
been especially wary less the logical 
appeal of the fiction should obscure 
fundamental problems and lead to unjust 
or ill advised results respecting a 
third party's rights. Thus, the ex-
ceptions to the theory of 'relation 
back' should have their typical appli-
cation to situations effecting an 
innocent third party. See, 55 C.J.S., 
Marriage, §68." 291 P.2d at 441. 
The Utah Legislature recognized the inherent 
unfairness of the "relation back" lega 1 fiction as 
it effects the rights of third parties by enacting 
Section 30-1-17, Utah Code Annotated at the same time 
that it amended the annulment provisions authorizing 
the award of alimony in an annulment proceeding. The 
legislature stated: "The judgment in the action shall 
either declare the marriage valid or annulled and 
shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned with 
the marriage." §30-1-17, Utah code Annotated (1953 
as amended). It is submitted that the language "a 11 
persons concerned with the marriage" concerns only 
those parties directly concerned with the marriage 
and not those third persons whose rights would be 
effected without any notice or right to participate 
in the annulment proceeding. 
-14-
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Finally, Plaintiff is contending that she was, 
during the period of her remarriage, entitled to two 
sources of support, i.e., from her former husband 
and her then husband. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CHILD SUPPORT 
AND AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN EXCESS 
OF THAT PRAYED BY PLAINTIFF IN HER 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
The court found a change of circumstance with 
respect to the minor children of the Plaintiff and 
Defendant herein and awarded an increase of child 
support to the sum of $160.00 per child per month, 
in spite of Plaintiff's requested prayer for an in-
crease to $140.00 per month. While Defendant agrees 
that the District Court always retains jurisdiction 
over minor children residing within the jurisdiction 
of the sta.te, the Defendant asserts that under these 
circumstances the Lower court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter such an award, and because this is an equity 
matter, the court may and should reverse Judge Hanson's 
ruling to the extent of the excess child support or 
attorneys fees awarded. 
By reason of the Order dated January B, 1976 
imposing sanction upon Defendant, Defendant was unable 
to assert his defenses to Plaintiff's Order to Show 
-15-
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cause on grounds of recommitment of his assets after 
Plaintiff's remarriage to her second husband or on his 
financial inability to provide any such amount as may 
be awarded. Thus, the Lower court refused, in spite of 
Defendant's Motion to Continue the hearing pending 
further objections to the Order of Sanctions or appeal, 
to allow Defendant to maintain any defenses respecting his 
financial abilities to provide the requested child sup-
port or alimony. Assuming its ruling was proper, to the 
extent the court made an award within the boundaries of 
Plaintiff's prayer for relief, the court exercised its 
discretion properly. However, to the extent the court 
awarded any amount in excess of that which was prayed 
for by Plaintiff without allowing Defendant to maintain 
any defenses with respect to his financial abilities to 
provide t~is greater amount, the court not only lacked 
jurisdiction, but acted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner. This same position holds true for any amounts awarded 
for attorneys fees in Plaintiff's favor in excess of that 
requested. 
It should be noted that at no time during these 
proceedings either before or after the Order of Sanction 
was imposed, did Plaintiff move to amend her Petition for 
Order to Show cause or prayer of relief. The Order of 
Sanction in the manner imposed is similar to a default 
-16-
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certificate based upon a party's complaint or petition. 
Surely a party who received such a default certificate 
in his favor would not +:hereafter amend his default 
judgment in an amount in excess of that which the 
default certificate was based upon. 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure 
states, in pertinent part: 
" (a) Claims for Re lief. A plead-
ing which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third party claim, sha 11 
contain ••• (2) a demand for judgment for 
the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled." 
The rule was drafted and fashioned after Rule 
S(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is 
liberally construed. Thus, the court has held that 
in equity proceedings, the relief granted may be some-
what broader than the specific relief prayed for. The 
relief demanded in any petition or complaint is gauged 
by the prayer which gives the Defendant or Respondent 
such precise information as to the judgment demanded 
that he may be able to decide whether or not to defend 
such an action. Thus, the prayer should be specific 
enough to conform to the allegations of the Plaintiff's 
pleadings and to inform the Defendant of the degree to 
which he will choose to defend the matter. 
Had the Order of Sanctions not been imposed against 
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the Defendant, it is submitted that the court would have 
had full power on its own motion to amend the Plaintiff's 
prayer for relief and award whatever amount it deemed 
necessary to provide for the minor childrens' support 
and maintenance within the confines of the Defendant's 
abilities to pay. However, the Order of Sanction imposed 
against the Defendant on January 8, 1976, together with 
the trial judge's refusal to allow Defendant to present 
any evidence respecting his financial condition imposes 
upon the trial court a duty not to grant relief greater 
than that which was prayed for since, arguendo, the 
Defendant was entitled at such point to determine whether 
or not to appeal or request other relief from the Order 
of Sanction. The District court denied Defendant equal 
protection of the laws in refusing to allow him to pre-
sent testimony respecting his financial condition as 
it applies to the award granted in excess of that re-
quested, and further denied Defendant the equal protec-
tion of the laws granted to an individual to make a 
choice to defend or not defend an action. 
clearly, this court would hold that a District 
court did not have jurisdiction to enter a default judg-
ment in excess of that which was originally prayed for 
without amendment by the praying party prior to the entry 
of the default certificate. 
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CONCLUSION 
By amending §30-1-17.2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
the Utah Legislature has chosen, without regard to 
whether a marriage is void or voidable, to attach to 
annulled marriages sufficient validity and significance 
to support an award of alimony so that, just as the case 
of any other valid marriage, there is a continuing duty 
to support the wife after the marriage is terminated, 
whether by divorce or annulment. The legislature, in 
so doing, destroyed the very foundation of the Cecil and 
Kent decisions. The Plaintiff's actions herein, whether 
to remarry or not, or whether to annul such marriage or 
terminate the remarriage by divorce, should not, in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, effect the obliga-
tion of Defendant herein once having relied an the 
Plaintiff's act of remarriage. Plaintiff has shown no 
exceptional circumstance for which this Court, or any 
other court, could consider a reinstatement of Defendant-
Respondent' s obligation to pay alimony to the Plaintiff. 
Finally, the District Court acted beyond its 
jurisdiction in awarding child support and attorneys 
fees to Plaintiff in excess of that which was requested 
and, accordingly, such excess award should be, in the 
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interest of equity, reversed. 
1976. 
Respectfully submitted this ,2 5" 4 day. of October, 
SANDACK & SANDACK 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0555 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served two copies 
of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by hand delivering 
the same to Harold G. Christensen and/or Ellen Maycock, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, at 700 Conti-
nental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 
day of October, 1976. 
SANDACK & SANDACK 
ROGER D. SANDACK 
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